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In the twentieth century, weak actors used guerrilla warfare in attempts to expel 
much stronger foreign forces from their territory with mixed success.  This often occurred 
in European colonial empires as subject peoples sought independence.  In such 
insurgencies or small wars, seldom can weaker actors ever hope to militarily vanquish the 
strong‘s forces.  The weaker power must instead convince the strong power to quit the 
fight, for until the strong power decides to withdraw its forces, the weak has not won.  
My question is what causes a strong power, faced with an insurgency in a distant 
territory, to throw in the towel, withdrawing its forces and making terms with the 
insurgents? 
In this paper I will argue that the decision by a strong power to abandon a war 
against irregular forces in an external territory depends on whether the leadership of the 
strong power feels the answer to the following three questions is ―no‖: 
(1) Can we win the peace?  If the strong power‘s leadership becomes convinced 
that its military action is not aiding the establishment of an advantageous and locally 
legitimate political order, they will be inclined to withdraw.   
(2) Will our present enemies still threaten us if we leave?  If strong powers‘ 
decision-makers feel that a political order following withdrawal would not be hostile, 
they will be inclined to withdraw. 
(3) Is there something in the territory we must have?  If the territory in 
question plays a crucial role in supplying natural resources such as oil to the metropole, 
the leadership will be inclined to continue the war.  If the territory is desired for another 
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reason, such as defensive military purposes, then policy-makers will be able to substitute 
control of the territory with other measures, such as off-shore naval forces, to secure their 
strategic aims, making them inclined to withdraw.    
Many scholars have argued that the economic and financial cost of the conflict, 
public opposition to it, and the degree of international sanction resulting from the war, are 
key factors in strong power withdrawal.  I will argue that these factors prove to be far less 
decisive than the three mentioned above.   
 
The Study of Insurgency:  Battle of Wills and Public Support 
Carl von Clausewitz famously tells us that ―war is a continuation of political 
intercourse, carried on with other means,‖1 and that a successful state combatant must 
align the powers of the ―trinity‖ of government, army, and people.2  War‘s political 
object of ―compel[ing] our enemy to do our will‖3 can come from the ―disarming of the 
enemy‖4—militarily defeating the enemy‘s armies—or by inflicting damage that seeks to 
convince the enemy that the ―expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political 
object‖5—in other words, targeting the will of the enemy‘s people and government and 
the resources of its country.  While some see irregular warfare as a launching pad for 
conventional victory,
6
 it typically serves as the latter sort of strategy, seeking to convince 
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the strong to make peace on the weak‘s terms by creating conditions in which the strong 
faces ―the improbability of victory‖ and an ―unacceptable cost.‖7   
In one of the first academic works on guerrilla warfare, Joseph Kraemer says that 
nationalist guerrillas raise the economic and military costs of maintaining political 
control and also subject the strong power to both international opprobrium and domestic 
political pressure to withdraw and end the conflict.
8
  He notes that much decolonization 
in the 1950s and 1960s was the result of war-damaged European economies being unable 
to sustain military counterinsurgency operations.
9
  Kraemer agrees with Robert Taber‘s 
contention that the ―oppressive power relinquishes its grasp‖ when the rebellious land 
―becomes (1) too great a political embarrassment to be sustained domestically or on the 
world stage, (2) unprofitable, too expensive, or no longer prestigious.‖10   
In an early major paper discussing why the weak defeat the strong, Andrew Mack 
says that the will, or the ―political capability‖ (italics in original) to wage war is a crucial 
determinant of victory: a big power fighting far from its metropole will by definition not 
have as much at stake as those fighting for their independence.  The weak‘s use of 
guerrilla warfare wearies the strong, and thus destroys the strong‘s domestic political 
ability to continue the conflict, even though they possess a preponderance of military 
power.  Because the metropole is not subject to invasion by the weak, the conflict is not 
an existential one for the strong, though it is for the guerrillas struggling against it in the 
conflict zone.
11
  The strong will be unwilling to engage in the necessary levels of 
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violence to bring the rebels to heel while nationalism will help the weak endure the 
reprisals of the strong.  Territories with substantial settler populations, for whom the 
conflict is existential, will prove much harder for weak combatants to defeat.
12
  Mack‘s 
analysis is groundbreaking, in that he notes that strong power defeat comes from its own 
decision to give up on the conflict and he addresses generally why the strong quit.  But he 
does not say how this decision is reached or what specific factors lead the strong to 
continue fighting and what leads it to withdraw and why it might do one or the other. 
Some recent scholarship examines how public opinion and domestic politics 
influences strong power defeats in insurgencies.  Gil Merom, noting that democracies are 
unusually successful in conventional war, argues ―that democracies fail in small wars 
because they find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to 
that which can secure victory‖13 because of ―disagreement between state and society over 
expedient and moral issues that concern human life and dignity.‖14  Essentially, ―the 
politically most relevant citizens‖ in the upper middle class are unwilling to allow their 
government to brutalize foreign populations in order to quell rebellion.  Merom cannot 
account for times when democracies have successfully defeated insurgencies, such as 
Britain in Kenya and Malaysia and the United States in the Philippines.  Why would 
British ―squeamishness‖ or ―lack of stomach‖ cause Britain to withdraw from Cyprus 
while pursuing a brutal victory in Kenya? 
Dominic Tierney contends that in America (and presumably, to some degree in 
other nations too), a ―quagmire mentality‖ sets in over time, that leads to disillusionment 
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  This is a product of American history (especially the Vietnam War), 
values and the way in which the American media covers military operations abroad.
16
 
With the benefits dubious and the costs mounting, the public‘s hope dissipates and there 
are calls for withdrawal.  Responding to public pressure, American leaders call it quits.  
For Tierney, America‘s political capability is destroyed by opposition to the war caused 
by the public‘s perceived hopelessness of the situation.  But this ―quagmire mentality‖ 
does not always set in right away or before the US achieves success (such as during the 
Filipino Insurrection).   He seems to preclude the thought that policymakers would be 
willing to take action against public opinion or with any concern other than domestic 
politics.  Tierney‘s thesis fails to explain why public opposition to the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, both of which have dragged on for years, has not led to withdrawal.  
Instead, American Presidents chose to escalate both conflicts when the war was least 
popular. 
 
The Study of Insurgency:  Clash of Arms 
Many recent studies focus on the military dimension of asymmetric conflicts.  
Ivan Arreguin-Toft argues an asymmetric war‘s outcome is determined largely by the 
interaction of strategies employed by both the strong and weak actors.
17
  For the weak, a 
direct strategy is an attempt to engage the front line combat units of the strong and hold 
territory against them.  An indirect strategy is guerrilla warfare that targets the strong 
forces‘ logistics and morale.  For the strong, a direct strategy is one that targets the 
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opponent‘s fighters and supplies, while an indirect strategy is barbarism that targets the 
opponent‘s civilian population through massacres and other reprisals.  In a dyad in which 
both combatants choose the same type of strategy—direct-direct or indirect-indirect—the 
strong will invariably win.  But if a strong and a weak actor employ different types of 
strategies, then the weak should prevail.  Guerrillas will eventually outlast a strong actor 
that seeks to find and kill guerrilla combatants while attempts to force the weak into 
submission by inflicting pain while leaving the weak side‘s combat power more or less 
intact should fail because they tend to increase the resistance of the weak.   
Arreguin-Toft‘s theory has many flaws.  In few conflicts do the combatants 
pursue pure ―direct‖ or ―indirect‖ strategies.  During the Irish War of Independence, the 
British military and security services often engaged in reprisal killings and destruction of 
property, but also engaged in ―direct action‖ and intelligence operations in targeting Irish 
Republican Army guerrillas.  During the Iraqi Revolution of 1920, Iraqis at times fought 
British outposts conventionally and overran them, but also harried the British with 
guerrilla tactics.  Further, Arreguin-Toft does not explain why a strong power would 
decide to withdraw—an essential aspect of strong power defeat is the strong side‘s own 
decision to discontinue the distant conflict.  He mentions that a preponderance of strength 
leads to expectations of easy victory, and when this does not occur, the strong becomes 
frustrated.  The strong are forced to increase the amount of resources devoted to the war 
and to resort to barbarism, both of which lead to domestic backlash against the war.
18
   
Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson also try to explain asymmetric war outcomes by 
focusing on the military conflicts themselves.  They argue that what is necessary to defeat 
insurgents is interaction with the local population, and that the more mechanized armies 
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are, the less they interact with the population.
19
  They suggest that as state militaries have 
become more mechanized, they are less infantry intensive and have less interaction with 
locals as they drive or fly by and bring along their own supplies instead of foraging.  But 
like Arreguin-Toft‘s thesis, their work ignores what drives the strong power‘s decision to 
withdraw when their mechanized military fails to quell irregular rebels.   
Jeffrey Record argues that many different factors determine whether the strong or 
weak will prevail in an asymmetric conflict, but that the single greatest factor is whether 
the weak actor has external support.  He notes ―highly motivated and skilled insurgents 
can be defeated if denied access to external assistance and confronted by a stronger side 
pursuing a strategy of barbarism against the insurgency‘s civilian population base.‖20  In 
addition to increasing the strong‘s battlefield costs of blood and treasure, Record notes 
that external support for insurgents causes a change in the balance of power in the 




The Study of Insurgency:  National and Military Culture 
Record also contends, like Tierney, that the United States has peculiar cultural 
factors, especially the military‘s and the public‘s ideas on war and victory, that make the 
US particularly vulnerable to defeat by insurgents.
22
  Other writers, such as military 
historian John Pimlott, argue that Britain and the British army are especially well suited 
to counter-insurgency war, based on Britain‘s long experience in imperial wars against 
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  While national culture may make victory more or less likely 
(Britain has lost counterinsurgencies, such as Cyprus Emergency, and the US has won 
them, such as the Filipino Insurrection), culture cannot be the decisive factor or alone 
trigger withdrawal. 
   
The Study of Insurgency:  Unanswered Questions 
 Current scholarship leaves some important questions unanswered.  How does the 
attrition of the strong by the weak combatant take effect?  Arreguin-Toft, Record and 
Lyall and Wilson all discuss important factors in how the war on the ground plays out.  It 
is logical to infer that failure to prevail on the battlefield leads somehow to withdrawal.   
Is the increasing financial cost of a drawn out war the decisive factor, as Kraemer and 
Taber contend?  Or does domestic dissatisfaction weigh heavier in policy makers‘ minds, 
as Merom and Tierney argue?   
Studies of asymmetric warfare pay insufficient attention to the impact the value of 
the territory being fought over has on the decision to continue in suppressing a rebellion 
or giving up on it.  It seems plausible that a strong power could find some territories more 
worth fighting for than others.  A territory can possess value in two ways:  by virtue of its 
location and its resources.  What role does the value of a territory, both the value of its 




                                                          
23
 John Pimlott, ―The British Army:  The Dhofar Campaign, 1970-1975,‖ in Armed Forces and Modern 
Counter-Insurgency, eds. Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott, (New York:  St. Martin‘s Press, 1985), 16-17. 
 Doyle 8 
 
I have selected four cases of rebellion from within the British Empire.  Two of the 
rebellions occurred following the First World War, the second two began during the 
1960s.  In each pairing, Britain withdrew from one territory and handed over power to its 
adversaries, while in the other pursued the fight and defeated the insurgency.  Selecting 
all British cases has a number of advantages.  Most important, it controls for factors of 
national culture and regime type, which Record, Pimlott, Merom, and Tierney view as 
important in determining when strong powers will abandon their military efforts against 
weak adversaries.  While holding constant the factors of regime type and national culture, 
I am able to explore the role public opinion, geography, and leaders‘ perceptions played 
in the determining whether or not to abandon the conflict. The vast nature of Britain‘s 
imperial holdings means Britain frequently found itself facing weak combatants, thus 
allowing for simultaneous comparisons.   
The heart of my research involves archival research, studying British Cabinet 
meeting minutes to determine what influenced the Cabinet‘s decisions in each conflict.  I 
supplemented the archival research by various secondary sources on each of the cases.  
Being that many works on insurgencies have been theoretical, such as Mack‘s and 
Kraemer‘s, or involve large-N quantitative studies, like Arreguin-Toft‘s and Lyall and 
Wilson‘s, my close examination of specific cases complements the existing literature and 
explores avenues neglected by scholars.  By parsing the discussions leading to key 
decisions, I can trace out how events on the battlefield, Britain‘s economic situation, and 
the pressures of public opinion shaped the actions of British ministers.  I can thus 
establish a link between these various pressures and the decision to withdraw. 
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Case Selection 
The first paired comparison is the Irish War of Independence (1919-1921) and the 
Iraqi Revolution (1920).  After World War I, Britain found itself facing revolts in its 
oldest and newest imperial holdings:  Ireland and Mesopotamia.  In both countries, the 
British military demonstrated a willingness to use great and indiscriminate violence to 
contain the unrest.  But by 1922, Britain had granted its oldest external possession 
dominion status (virtual independence; the same status enjoyed by Canada) and turned 
over power to a Sinn Fein/Irish Republican Army government.  In Mesopotamia (soon re-
named Iraq by the British), Britain asserted its League of Nation Mandate, remaining a 
dominant influence in the country until the 1958 Iraqi Revolution.   
The second paired comparison is the Aden Emergency (1963-1967) and the 
Dhofar Rebellion (1964-1975).  In the early 1960s leftist guerrilla groups challenged 
Britain‘s pre-eminent position in southern Arabia in both the Aden Protectorate and the 
Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.  In both Aden and Muscat and Oman, Britain exercised 
power in collaboration with local rulers.  The British Army had recently crushed 
insurgencies in Kenya (the Mau Mau Rebellion) and Malaysia (the Malay Emergency).  
Yet in 1967 Britain withdrew from Aden, abandoning it to the leftist forces.  In 
neighboring Oman, Britain redoubled its assistance and brought in other regional allies to 
assist the Sultanate in defeating the rebels. The campaign took over a decade and British 
officials dominated the administration of the Omani government and military well into 
the 1980s.   
My case selection allows me to examine a number of factors in relative isolation, 
determining what causes withdrawal.  The comparison of Iraq and Ireland allows for 
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comparison in norms, examining whether using violence against Arabs in a distant land 
was perhaps more acceptable to the British public than using it against fellow Europeans 
in a neighboring isle.  It also allows me to compare the relative value of territory, looking 
at oil rich Iraq versus resource poor Ireland, and the importance of a territory‘s location, 
comparing a North Atlantic island to Middle Eastern land neighboring Turkey and Persia 
and close to Russia.   
The comparison of Aden and Oman holds relatively constant the value of a 
territory‘s location and resources.  Both are located in southern Arabia and have middling 
oil wealth.  Both conflicts pitted the British and their local allies against leftist rebels in 
Arab countries, so there is no reason why use of violence against Arab leftists should be 
viewed with more moral opprobrium in one territory than another.  This comparison 
permits an examination of the role domestic party politics and ideology play in a 
withdrawal decision.  During the war in Oman, the Conservative Party, generally more 
hawkish, took power from Labour for a time, only to lose it again before the Anglo-
Omani military effort succeeded.  The change in government permits an examination of 
the impact of political ideology on the decision-making process. 
By looking at events at two different points in time, I am able to examine British 
policy making during different economic and international political situations.  Looking 
at two pairs also helps mitigate the impact of factors unique to each pair in the four 
decisions.   
It is important to note that all these conflict zones bore a different constitutional 
relationship with Britain.  Ireland was part of Great Britain, legally the same as England, 
Scotland, and Wales.  Mesopotamia (Iraq) was a League of Nations Mandate, given to 
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Britain to administer but not technically under British sovereignty.  The city of Aden 
itself was a Crown Colony, surrounded by tribal protectorates.  Muscat and Oman was 
technically independent but was a de facto British protectorate, controlled by British 
soldiers and administrators.  All these conflicts occurred in an era of rising nationalist 
challenges to British dominance, challenges which would eventually contribute to the 
collapse of the Empire.  It should be made clear then that in each case, Britain was not 
fighting to retain complete administrative control over the territory.  In fact, in all of the 
cases, Britain had decided it would be lessening its administrative control over the 
territory.  What Britain desired was to preserve ―the patterns which had constituted the 
traditional imperial system‖ that substituted ―informal control‖ for direct rule.24  In 
Ireland and Aden, Britain failed to do so.  While Ireland retained some links to the British 
Crown, power was handed over to an IRA/Sinn Fein government with the power to make 
laws, collect taxes, set trade policy, raise troops, and conduct external relations.  In Aden, 
power was transferred to the National Liberation Front, which established a Soviet-bloc 
state.  In Iraq and Oman, nominally independent monarchies were managed by British 
soldiers and administrators well beyond the conflict‘s end. 
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CHAPTER 2 
IRELAND AND IRAQ 
At the end of World War I, British and allied armies were victorious throughout 
the world, but the Empire was badly overstretched financially and militarily.  Britain‘s 
wartime leader, Prime Minister David Lloyd George, faced a tricky diplomatic endgame 
finalizing peace treaties with Germany and Ottoman Turkey, dealing with the creation of 
the Soviet Union as the first communist state and the rise of the United States as a major 
power, and contending with a recession in Britain.   
As the Empire‘s armies were demobilized, Britain faced a number of new military 
threats.  In its oldest possession, Ireland, the Irish members of Parliament refused to take 
their seats and declared an independent republic.  They soon backed up this claim with a 
campaign of guerrilla warfare.  In Mesopotamia, which British forces had occupied since 
the middle of the war, a nationalist revolt brought Sunni and Shia Arabs together in a 
bloody war against the British occupation forces.  At great expense in blood and treasure, 
Britain crushed the revolt in Mesopotamia but negotiated a peace treaty that granted 
independence to most of Ireland.  In this chapter I will argue that Britain abandoned its 
war in Ireland because (1) Cabinet members believed establishing an enduring, pro-
British government was impossible, meaning Britain had ―lost the peace,‖  (2) the terms 
Irish rebel leaders were willing to accept convinced British leaders that an independent 
Ireland would not be a threat, and (3) British leaders believed retaining naval bases on the 
Irish coast would allow the Royal Navy to adequately defend Great Britain‘s maritime 
approaches.  I will also argue that Britain persevered in suppressing the Iraqi revolt 
because (1) Cabinet leaders always believed Britain could establish a locally legitimate 
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pro-British government, (2) British leaders felt withdrawal from any part of Iraq would 
leave a vacuum of power that would be filled by a rival power, threatening Britain‘s 
position in Persia and southern Iraq, and (3) leaving Mesopotamia would forfeit British 
access to local oil reserves. 
 
Irish War of Independence 
 Ireland was formally incorporated in the United Kingdom in 1801, with the same 
constitutional status as England, Scotland, and Wales.  Periodic revolts continued and by 
the late nineteenth century there was a strong movement for Irish autonomy.  In 1914, 
after decades of Irish pressure, the British parliament passed a controversial Home Rule 
Act that would have granted Ireland some domestic autonomy, but because Irish 
Protestants objected, implementation of the act was postponed.  In 1916 a small group of 
radical Irish nationalists staged a German-backed revolt in downtown Dublin.  The 
execution of the revolt‘s leaders and a proposal to introduce conscription into Ireland 
towards the end of WWI increased pro-independence and anti-British sentiment in 
Ireland.  In the British general elections at the close of 1918, the Irish separatist party 
Sinn Fein won virtually all seats in Ireland except in a few predominantly Protestant areas 
in the northern part of the island.  The Sinn Fein delegates declared a republic on January 
21, 1919 and the Irish Republican Army, Sinn Fein‘s military wing, commenced guerrilla 
warfare against the Royal Irish Constabulary and the British Army. 
 The British government was focused on the Versailles peace conference where 
Lloyd George was heading the British delegation.  The war started slowly and was seen 
first as a policing problem with the Sinn Fein parliament a bigger concern for British 
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leaders than IRA violence.
25
  British leaders feared an independent Irish republic would 
pose an unacceptable threat to the security of Britain itself.
26
  Ireland was crucial to 
guarding the western maritime approaches to Britain.  In addition to concern that Sinn 
Fein was a pro-Bolshevik organization, there were worries that an independent Ireland 
allied with the United States would challenge British naval superiority.  America was in 
the midst of naval build up Britain could not afford to match.
27
 The president of the 
declared Irish Republic, Eamon de Valera, was an American citizen by virtue of his New 
York birth.  He spent much of 1919 and 1920 touring the United States, attracting crowds 
in the tens of thousands.
28
  Irish-American groups were lobbying hard for US support of 
Irish independence and other idealistic Americans took up the Irish cause, and the British 
Ambassador in Washington worried the United States might come out in support of Sinn 
Fein.
29
  Thus, Britain felt it imperative to retain control over Ireland‘s security and 
external affairs.  The most generous proposal for Ireland the Cabinet discussed by the end 
of 1919 envisioned an autonomous Ireland with no military or war making capability, no 
independent foreign policy, and a currency and trade policy set by the United Kingdom.
30
 
As 1919 progressed the IRA began to make its presence felt throughout much of 
Ireland by attacks on police barracks and other symbols of government.  By the summer 
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the Cabinet and press realized the situation in Ireland needed to be addressed.
31
  Through 
1919, the British security services were unsure of the enemy they were facing.  Many 
British leaders perceived Sinn Fein and the IRA as closet Bolsheviks and the nature of 
the IRA, who ran it, and the degree of its centralization were all in doubt. 
32
 Many in the 
Cabinet, including the Chief Secretary for Ireland, felt that punitive actions would soon 
have effect and return Ireland to British control.
33
 
 As 1920 began British security services found themselves subject to ever fiercer 
attacks. The Royal Irish Constabulary, the all Irish and mostly Catholic paramilitary 
police force, was unable to function adequately or obtain recruits.
34
  By May, police and 
military leaders in Ireland had requested reinforcements and the Cabinet decided to 
establish special paramilitary police units composed of demobilized WWI veterans to 
help restore order.
35
  By now, the Irish police had abandoned large parts of the 
countryside in the face of IRA attacks.  Military commanders in Ireland requested planes 
to conduct an air campaign against the IRA and their request was turned down only 
because no spare planes were on hand in Britain.
36
 Because a formal treaty with the 
Ottoman Empire had not yet been signed, war-time emergency powers were maintained 
and the Cabinet readied legislation to extend emergency powers and try guerrillas in 
special military tribunals.
37
  With the arrival of British reinforcements, especially 
members of the paramilitary auxiliaries, the war intensified dramatically and with a much 
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higher civilian cost.  The paramilitary police, known as ―Black and Tans‖ for their 
combination of brown Army and black police uniforms, were infamous for their atrocities 
and reprisal killings, which were reported in the British and American press.
38
 
 In addition to the escalation of the War, the Cabinet developed a political solution 
in the form of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act.  Since the passage of the 1914 Home 
Rule Act, many in Ireland and Britain assumed Ireland would have some degree of self 
rule in the future and the Cabinet sought some form of political solution to the ―Irish 
question‖ from early in the conflict.39  The Government of Ireland Act granted limited 
autonomy to what would become Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland, designated 
Southern Ireland, separately.  The new Act to appeased Protestant Unionists and their 
Conservative supporters in Parliament and the Cabinet who had balked at the idea of by 
the all-Ireland parliament in the 1914 Home Rule Act.  Lord Privy Seal Andrew Bonar 
Law, the ranking Conservative in Lloyd George‘s Tory-Liberal coalition government, 
was okay with an Irish Republic—he in fact recommended ―turning disloyal Ireland out 
of the Empire‖—but felt that no right-thinking person would ―ever think of forcing the 
loyal and Protestant North into the same political mould as the disloyal and Roman 
Catholic South.‖40  The Act was also designed to appease public opinion in the UK and 
abroad, prevent the 1914 Act from coming into force, and make Sinn Fein appear as 
uncompromising radicals.
41
   
 As winter approached the War continued and violence surged.  Lloyd George 
scoffed at criticism of Black and Tan brutality, saying the Black and Tans had ―struck the 
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terrorists and now the terrorists are complaining of terror,‖ indicating his intention to 
crush the rebels.
42
 In December, large parts of Ireland were placed under martial law,
43
 so 
that reprisals could be brought ―under official control‖ for greater effect.44  The 
imposition of martial law and the fierce counter-guerrilla operations had significantly 
damaged the IRA‘s organization and convinced British police and military leaders the 
IRA was on the ropes.  At a December 29 Cabinet meeting, the British police and Army 
commanders in Ireland reported that the IRA could be crushed in another four months or 
so.
45
  But British political leaders was starting to lose hope of bringing the conflict to a 
close by military means alone by the end of 1920.  When Lloyd George asked the 
assembled generals and commandants if an election could be held in early 1921 and what 
the result would likely be, he was told it would probably be boycotted on orders from 
Michael Collins, the IRA Director of Intelligence and de facto leader.  To this the Prime 
Minister remarked, ―if Michael Collins could stop three million people from using their 
vote, it did not say much for the success of the policy His Majesty‘s Government was 
now pursuing.‖46  
 As the war escalated through 1920, British leaders began to get a clearer 
understanding of their foe.  They began to see Sinn Fein and the IRA as relatively 
hierarchal and under the control of Irish President de Valera and Michael Collins.
47
  Sinn 
Fein had begun sending peace feelers to the British government, primarily through 
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members of the Catholic clergy.
48
  Some members of Cabinet, especially Lloyd George, 
began to feel that they could arrange a truce with the IRA and then negotiate a final 
settlement along the lines of the Government of Ireland Act.
49
   
 In rough agreement that further military action was of limited use, the Cabinet 
decided to respond to the Sinn Fein negotiation offers.
50
  Secret meetings and 
indeterminate violence continued for many months as Sinn Fein and British negotiators 
edged towards a cease fire.
51
  Sir Anthony Cope, a former detective was named Assistant 
Under-Secretary for Ireland and somehow put himself in touch with senior Sinn Fein and 
IRA leaders.  These first steps toward a negotiated settlement were halting and had made 
little head way by early spring.
52
  Sinn Fein was unwilling to surrender its arms or agree 
to preconditions.  
Lloyd George still hoped that military means might advance his ends and let him 
negotiate from a position of strength.
53
  He felt moderate Irish leaders and Sinn Fein 
members would come forward, but not until the IRA had been sufficiently broken up.
54
  
Once this happened, Sinn Fein and the Government would negotiate ―for the discussion 
of such amendments to the Government of Ireland Act as will make it acceptable to the 
people of Southern Ireland,‖ in the words of Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu.  
So the War continued, with mixed results for the British.  By April General Nevil 
Macready reported that the IRA ―flying columns‖ that had operated openly in 1920 were 
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  In June, the security services found and seized IRA headquarters 
in Dublin and captured many IRA veterans when the IRA attacked the Dublin Customs 
House.
56
  Yet Sinn Fein and the IRA demonstrated a strong hold over the population.  In 
the May elections for the Southern Ireland legislature, Sinn Fein won all seats except 
those reserved for Trinity College, Dublin.
57
  A Colonel sent by the War Office to assess 
the military situation in Ireland reported back that, ―the British Army in Ireland is 
besieged,‖ either hunkered behind defenses or traveling only in armed units while, ―on 
the other hand, the population moves when, where, and by whatever route it wishes. This 
is a curious situation for a force whose raison d’être in the country is to maintain 
order.‖58 
In June 1921, with the Protestant Unionists secure in their own autonomous 
region in Northern Ireland, Britain threw in the towel and offered Sinn Fein a truce 
without preconditions  and an offer of Dominion status.  Sinn Fein leaders went to 
London for final negotiations.
59
  The resulting Anglo-Irish treaty established an Irish 
state, known as the ―Irish Free State‖ and possessing the same constitutional links to the 
British crown as Canada.  The treaty reserved British sovereignty over three naval bases 
on the Irish coast, had Ireland assume a portion of Britain‘s war debt, and proscribed the 
Irish army from enlisting a higher percentage of the Irish population than Britain did of 
its own.  It also specified that the final borders between Northern Ireland and the Free 
State would be decided by a boundary committee.
60
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Why did Britain Quit? 
 Three factors led to the British government‘s decision to negotiate peace with 
Sinn Fein and withdraw from most of Ireland:  the sense that Britain had ―lost the peace,‖ 
the perception an independent Ireland would not threaten British security, and the 
acknowledgement there was nothing in Ireland Britain needed.  As Lloyd George began 
to realize in his December 1920 meeting with the police and army commanders, no form 
of British rule would be accepted as legitimate by the Irish.    The Sinn Fein sweep of the 
Southern Ireland elections confirmed this, as did the inability to recruit Irishmen to the 
security services.  For over a century before 1919, the predominantly Catholic RIC kept 
order in Ireland.  By the last week of June 1921, only 12 of the RIC‘s 224 new recruits 
were Irish.
61
  In June the Army also noted that they did not feel Irish units could be used 
in Ireland.
62
  The Irish people and Sinn Fein would not accept mere ―amendments to the 
Government of Ireland Act‖ and continued war would not make British rule any more 
legitimate.  Britain had ―lost the peace.‖ 
 The fact that Ireland agreed to acknowledge the British sovereign as Head of State 
convinced the Cabinet that Ireland would be unlikely to break decisively with Britain in 
the realm of foreign affairs.  Because Sinn Fein was willing to accept Dominion status, 
rather than their desired republic, the Cabinet felt Ireland would not be completely hostile 
after the withdrawal of British troops.  Members of the press, the Cabinet, and other 
Dominion leaders had long advocated this move would satisfy many Irish aspirations and 
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  The fact that Northern Irish Protestants were secure in their 
British run enclave meant no religious war would erupt after Britain‘s departure. 
 Further, Ireland‘s value as a defensive bulwark in the Atlantic was be retained.  
The treaty granted the Royal Navy three bases, known as ―treaty ports,‖ allowing it to 
secure the seaward approaches to Britain and thus allayed Britain‘s main security concern 
regarding Ireland.  As long as the seas could be secured, Britain derived no real 
additional value from administering Ireland. 
 
Other Factors Examined 
 Public opposition to the conflict does not appear to have been a decisive factor in 
Britain‘s decision to end the War. The War was never popular and the harsh measures of 
the British security services angered much of the British public.  The proximity of Ireland 
meant events were well covered in the British press.  However, the War was unpopular 
from its onset; had British leaders been merely following public opinion, the War would 
have ended much sooner.  Instead it dragged on for two and a half years.  The decision to 
form the Black and Tans and other military auxiliaries was taken with the full knowledge 
that the action would be described as the ―reconquest of Ireland‖ by the British press.64  
Up until the eve of the truce, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, vigorously defended 
the government‘s harsh policies.65  If the Cabinet‘s overriding goal had been to appease 
public opposition to the war, the public escalation, bombastic rhetoric, and declarations 
of martial law were an odd way to do it.   
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 The role of international pressure also appears to be rather minimal.  Public 
sympathy abroad for the Irish cause seldom translated into political pressure.  Sinn Fein 
pinned great hopes on Irish Americans, who strongly supported the cause of Irish 
independence.  However, fervent lobbying efforts and outpourings of support for Sinn 
Fein failed to move the Wilson administration, which remained pro-British throughout its 
tenure.
66
  Ireland failed to win international recognition from any country save the Soviet 
Union, which was itself internationally isolated.  The Dominions lobbied in favor of 
Ireland, with Irish-Canadians and Irish-Australians at the forefront of pro-Irish efforts.  
But like the British public, the Irish Diaspora in particular and the English-speaking 
world in general opposed the war from the start.  While outrage at British policy 
concerned the Cabinet, it was largely just lamented, especially when it did not translate 
into official pressure.  As early as February of 1919 the Cabinet was aware that the 
―unsolved Irish question‖ was the main source of Anglo-American friction,67 but 
proceeded to engage in years of warfare.  Dire warnings from the British embassy in 
Washington began in the Spring of 1919 and prompted little action from the Cabinet.
68
  
The biggest concern was expressed at the refusal of Irish-American dockworkers to load 
and unload British ships in New York and Boston, which could have caused a significant 
danger to British trade.
69
 
 What certainly did not cause British withdrawal was a lack of resources.  It is true 
that at the end of WWI, British troops were very overextended and the country was 
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heavily in debt.  Though while the British army and air forces were heavily committed in 
the Middle East, Britain was easily able to recruit auxiliary forces from recently 
demobilized soldiers.  Had Britain desired to continue the conflict, forces could have 
been removed from the Middle East, especially after the peace with Turkey and the end 
of the worst of the Egyptian and Iraqi revolts.  As the War Office noted, ―compared with 
Mesopotamia, Ireland was a small affair... Broadly speaking, we had only lost in Ireland 
one-tenth of the men, and Ireland had only cost one-tenth of the money expended in 
Mesopotamia.‖70   
 
 
The Iraqi Revolution of 1920 
 British forces from the Indian Army landed in the Ottoman province of Basra in 
1914 to open another front against the Ottoman Turks during WWI.  The initial 
expedition was a failure and had to surrender in 1916.  A second invasion in 1917 fared 
better and the end of the war left the British Army in possession of much of the Ottoman 
provinces of Baghdad and Basra, what is now southern and central Iraq, which the British 
then referred to as Mesopotamia.  The region had been allotted to Britain by the secret 
wartime Sykes-Picot Agreement and shortly after the armistice between the Ottomans 
and the allies on October 30, 1918, British administrators from the Indian government 
arrived to administer the province.  Local Arabs resented this imposition of Indian law.  
Throughout 1919 Mesopotamians chafed under the occupation and there were scattered 
outbreaks of violence.  After the Conference at San Remo in April 1920, it was 
announced that the three Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra would form a 
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League of Nations Mandate of Iraq administered by Britain.  This announcement sparked 
outrage and the revolt began at the end of May.
71
 
 Initially, the extent of the revolt and the competence of the local Arab forces 
caught the British by surprise.  In the early summer of 1920 many small British outposts 
were overrun or had to be abandoned.  Hundreds of British soldiers were taken prisoner.  
Many units were cut-off in remote outposts.
72
  The General Officer Commanding in 
Mesopotamia, James Aylmer Lothorpe Haldrane, Mesopotamia requested reinforcements 
which were dispatched from Persia and India.  The Cabinet decided to sack the British 
civilian leader, Civil Commissioner Sir Arnold Wilson, and replace him with a veteran 
Middle East hand, Sir Percy Cox.
73
  The government in London committed to a long 
campaign to pacify Mesopotamia, approving a plan developed in Baghdad to ―contract to 
railheads in Mesopotamia, and develop [the] Air Force there, and gradually re-occupy as 
our strength grows and circumstances allow in the next few years.‖  The additional units, 
including armor and airplanes, would allow the army to ―handle roughly‖ the 
Mesopotamian rebels.
74
   
 Throughout the summer, the Cabinet‘s discussions do not indicate that they gave 
much thought to abandoning the new Iraq Mandate.  Discussion often involved how 
Britain‘s new Middle East territories would be administered (whether by the Foreign 
Office, Colonial Office, Indian government, or a new Middle East office) and the nature 
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that the Iraqi oil concession would take.
75
 Early in June, Secretary of War Winston 
Churchill circulated a plan to withdraw from northern Iraq and northwest Persia, 
concentrating forces in central and southern Mesopotamia.
76
  Churchill‘s plan only 
involved abandoning the northern countryside and concentrating forces in Baghdad.  Talk 
of withdrawal seems to have been quashed three days later when India Secretary Edwin 
Montagu circulated a recent telegram from Cox saying, ―we must hold what we then had 
with the troops then in the country, or clear out,‖ and ―there was no middle course.‖77  
  At the end of July, the news from Mesopotamia worsened.  Haldrane informed 
the War Office that Baghdad may have to be abandoned.
78
  Many of the requested 
reinforcements had not arrived from India and would not be in the field until August.  But 
the British military and civilian leadership in Baghdad were not all on the same page.  
The same day that Haldrane wrote about abandoning Baghdad, Cox cabled his own 
analysis back to London suggesting that the grievances of the Arab rebels were largely 
local and that in three years time a pro-British regime could be established.
79
  It was 
Lloyd George and Montagu‘s handpicked man, Cox, who had the ear of the Cabinet.  
Whereas the GOC‘s communiqués were transmitted through the War Office, Cox often 
communicated directly with the Cabinet at large. 
 As British and Indian reinforcements poured in from Persia and India, the British 
went on the offensive.  By August the news from Baghdad was that the British were 
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beginning to get a handle on things.  The ―situation had eased considerably‖ and London 
was told that not quite as many reinforcements were needed as thought in July.
80
  By 
September the War Office reported to Parliament that ―the back of the rebellion has been 
broken.‖81  Despite the fact that violence continued, Cox was instructed to establish an 
Arab-run Iraqi government.
82
  From the late summer on, Cabinet members were told by 
Cox and others on the ground in Mesopotmia that a local government could be 
established that would take over much of the administrative and military duties from 
Britain.
83
  In the person of Feisal bin Al-Hussein, the military leader of the British-backed 
Arab Revolt against the Ottomans in WWI, Cox and other Middle East experts felt they 
had good candidate to build a pro-British administration around.
84
 
 It was in the Fall and early Winter, when British military might was prevailing, 
that members of Cabinet started to consider abandoning large parts of Mesopotamia.  At 
no time did the Cabinet ever discuss abandoning the whole country, but there was a lot of 
debate as to whether all of what is modern day Iraq should be retained or only the 
southern, Shia dominated portions which constituted the Ottoman province of Basra.  An 
expensive army of occupation would have to remain in Iraq for some time while a new 
Arab one was established.
85
  Churchill, worried about the strain Mesopotamia placed on 
the War Office budget even before the war started, was a constant advocate for 
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withdrawal to Basra to cut costs.
86
  By October, Montagu also doubted Iraq was worth 
the cost.
87
  Churchill and the General Staff felt the greater Basra area could be held with 
less troops than all of Mesopotamia.
88
  Britain could thus retain the northern part of the 
Persian Gulf, protecting the passage to India and secure the most well known oil fields.  
Additionally there was strong public opposition to the war, especially related to the great 
cost of the army.
89
   
 
Why Did Britain Stay? 
 Britain persevered in Iraq because British leaders believed that military efforts 
were leading toward a desirable political solution—a British-dominated Iraqi state, 
because withdrawal would have left a power vacuum that would have destabilized British 
interests throughout the Middle East, and because some form of British control was 
necessary to gain access to Iraqi oil. 
Cabinet members felt that a massive British presence and expenditure was not 
indefinite after Cox began establishing a local government.  Instead, Iraq could become a 
boon to the Empire.  Cox reported to London that a pro-British indigenous establishment 
could be quickly established and that it would largely maintain order with its own Arab 
troops
90—not unlike the way India and British African colonies were primarily 
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garrisoned with native troops.
91
  As Arab troops were raised, the British military role 
could be largely restricted to that of air support.  As long as local Arabs were 
substantially involved in the administration of the territory, Cox felt they would accept 
the British Mandate.
92
  Thus a few years of expense could transform Mesopotamia into a 
new India:  Iraqi oil would fuel the British fleet and make profits for British corporations, 
a British controlled Arab administration would keep order in Iraq, and British advisors 
would develop the local economy.  Iraqi troops would serve as needed throughout the 
Empire, just as Indian troops did.
93
 Cox, Haldrane, and other experts on the scene 
reported that other than some of the urban intelligentsia, most rebels were not 
nationalists, but tribesmen fighting due to local grievances, a violent nature, financial 
inducement from Turkish intelligence, or because tribal leaders felt Britain was weak and 
they sensed opportunity.
94
  Most of the new ―Iraqis‖ would thus be content with a British 
Mandate as long as the administration ―had a truly Arab Facab [system]‖ and was 
―predominantly Arab.‖95 Thus no matter the military difficulties faced by the British 
Army, should British arms prevail the Cabinet could trust that their man in Baghdad, 
Cox, would ―win the peace‖ by establishing a British-dominated and locally legitimate 
government. 
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 Withdrawal was rejected by Lloyd George and much of the Cabinet (Churchill 
being the major dissenter), because they feared the resulting vacuum of power would be 
filled by Bolshevik, Turkish, and French influence.  The General Staff labeled the 
―Turkish and Bolshevik menace‖ as the main danger to British forces in Mesopotamia 
and Persia.
96
 Haldane warned of Turkey‘s ―aggressive intentions against Mosul Villayet 
[sic]‖ in northern Iraq.97  An India  Office report was more dire, declaring, ―we must 
recognise that we are fighting in Mesopotamia not a constitutional question as to the 
future government of Mesopotamia, but for the very existence of civilisation in the 
Middle East. If we are driven out, only anarchy can supervene.‖98  Military and civilian 
leaders alike such a withdrawal would ruin Britain‘s image in the Arab world, because 
―everyone knew what retirement meant when carried out in front of a native enemy.‖99   
 Churchill‘s partial withdrawal to southern Iraq was rejected as well.  The Cabinet 
was informed that there was no natural defensive line in the south of Mesopotamia and 
―very large consensus of military and Governmental opinion on the spot [Baghdad] held 
that the retirement to the line proposed by the General Staff would at any rate in the event 
of attack, require as large a force as is required to hold the present area of occupation.‖  
Foreign policy experts informed the Cabinet in December ―that if this [Churchill‘s] 
policy were adopted the British Mandate would be destroyed, the local Arab Government 
would disappear and its local levies would never be raised; and the Turks, possibly in 
collusion with the Bolsheviks, would enter into the vacuum thus created.‖ 100  There was 
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also the possible France would take advantage of British weakness.  The War Office 
noted that French forces had concentrated in eastern Syria near Mosul at the start of the 
summer
101
 and Haldane noted that the French ―may seek to protect their own interests 
without regard to ours.‖102  It was clear to the Cabinet that withdrawal, even a partial one, 
meant a hostile entity would arise in the center of the Middle East in position to threaten 
Britain‘s hold over the Persian Gulf and the oil fields of Persia and Basra. 
Finally, Britain needed a presence in Mesopotamia to access the oil there.  By 
WWI, the Empire and especially the Royal Navy were dependent on Persian Gulf oil and 
the decision to invade Mesopotamia was in part to secure the oil there.
103
  When reports 
of unrest reached London, the first thing Churchill asked Haldane about was the security 
of oil fields in Mesopotamia and Persia.
104
  Lloyd George was ardently against a 
withdrawal from northern Iraq, as that would let the oil contracts for Mosul‘s oil fields 
would go to American or French companies.
105
  Even if the route to India could have 
been secured by the occupation of Basra (which everyone but Churchill doubted), Britain 
needed a military presence in the rest of Iraq to access the oil in the north. 
 
Other Factors Examined 
 Despite the War‘s high cost in men and material at a time of government belt-
tightening and military demobilization, resource constraints failed to force British 
withdrawal.  War in Mesopotamia was a crushing strain on resources on an already 
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  The expense of the War was large and the most frequently 
discussed aspect of the conflict in Cabinet.  In a Cabinet discussion on the 1921 defense 
budget, members agreed that Parliament would only pass additional funding for 
Mesopotamia with great difficulty and assurances that the 1921 budget ―represented the 
end of the heavy military expenditure, particularly in the Near East.‖107  The British 
government was reduced to begging the Dominions for troops
108
 (a request that was 
denied
109
) and denuded Persia of forces to fight in Mesopotamia.
110
  The Iraqi rebels did a 
good job of raising British financial, material, and personnel costs, but their efforts were 
more than matched by Britain‘s ability to reallocate resources.  Britain was willing to 
divert resources from other objectives (such as backing the Shah of Persia and using 
aircraft that were being requested in Ireland) in order to prevail in Mesopotamia.   
Like the war in Ireland, the Mesopotamian War was also unpopular with the war-
weary British public and press.  The public was especially concerned about the War‘s 
ballooning cost.
111
  Most damaging was Colonel T.E. Lawrence‘s (Lawrence of Arabia) 
condemnation of the War.  Lawrence slammed British involvement in Mesopotamia as ―a 
trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honour,‖ and wrote, ―our 
government is worse than the old Turkish system.‖112  While such criticisms posed 
difficulties, Cabinet members felt they could wait out and work around them.  Montagu, 
the Cabinet member most concerned with public opinion, fumed to the other Ministers 
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about what he termed Lawrence‘s ―hostile—and in my view unmerited—criticisms.‖113 
He suggested that the government not tell the public and parliament ―we have accepted 
internal and external responsibilities for Mesopotamia,‖ but instead, ―let us leave the 
public, for the present at any rate, to believe… that the Mandate will be to form an Arab 
Government, and to relieve ourselves of all responsibility as quickly as possible.‖114  
Churchill was instructed to request the minimum amount of funds necessary for 1921 to 
lessen anti-war sentiment.
115
   
The British government relied heavily on Indian troops during the Mesopotamian 
War, which would seem to insulate the British public from the costs of the War.  Yet the 
British public, suffering under a massive tax burden while the government sought to pay 
down war debts,
116
 were well aware of the War‘s financial cost.117  The use of Indian 
troops meant Indian public opinion had to be taken into account, especially after the 1919 
Amritsar Massacre by British troops.  Concerns about Indian public opinion, which was 
against the War,
118
 and the reliability of Indian troops was an issue throughout the 
War.
119
  Some Indian soldiers felt they were being ―exploited‖ and many had been 
deployed to the Middle East since early in WWI, while white troops from Britain and the 
Dominions had been demobilized.
120
  Montagu warned of ―grave political consequences 
if we try to enforce the Turkish peace by Indian mercenaries.‖121  Yet, like with resource 
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constraints, hostile public opinion in both Britain and India was not a decisive factor in 
decision-making. 
The Iraqi Revolution is infamous for being the first instance of widespread 
coercive bombing of civilians.  Given the widespread criticism of British reprisals in 
Ireland, it seems logical that Britain‘s seemingly freer hand to use brutality against non-
white Muslims, especially via air, could have aided Britain in suppressing the revolt.  A 
closer examination reveals a greater ability to brutalize civilians was far from decisive.  
First, British conduct was less wanton than commonly believed.  It is true that Royal Air 
Force did ―handle roughly‖ the rebels.  Cox told the Cabinet that airborne reprisals at 
times killed innocents and was one of the ―reasons underlying the loss by the civil 
administration of that degree of popularity which it first enjoyed.‖122 Clearly there was 
concern in some quarters about the repercussions of aerial reprisals and the RAF itself 
noted it was necessary to have a ―very efficient intelligence service‖ to appropriately 
target reprisals.
123
  Nor was the financial cost the only source of public opposition to the 
War.  For example, Lawrence protested against ―illegal executions‖ for ―political 
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CHAPTER 3 
ADEN AND OMAN 
 As Britain left many of its imperial possessions after the Second World War, it 
still envisioned a global role that included involvement in Asia and Africa.  Despite no 
longer controlling India, Britain was still responsible for the defense of the Indian Ocean 
in the Anglo-American Cold War division of labor.
125
  Britain was especially keen on 
maintaining its presence on the Arabian Peninsula.  British officials felt that the presence 
of British forces ensured local stability, secured British investments in the region, and 
guaranteed that oil flowed uninterrupted to Europe.   
In the mid 1960s, two rebellions against British-backed regimes began along the 
southern edge of the Arabian Peninsula.  In Aden, Britain abandoned its 
counterinsurgency effort, turning over power to the Communist National Liberation Front 
while in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman‘s neighboring Dhofar province, British and 
allied forces persevered and eventually defeated the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Oman and the Arabian Gulf in an eleven year war.  In this chapter I will demonstrate that 
Britain abandoned its war in Aden because (1) Cabinet members believed establishing an 
enduring, pro-British government was impossible, meaning Britain had ―lost the peace,‖  
(2) the Cabinet did not know of the NLF‘s East Bloc ties and did not believe an NLF-run 
Aden would be a Soviet client-state, and (3) British leaders believed an increased military 
presence off-shore and in the Persian Gulf would mitigate the loss of Aden.  I will also 
show that in Oman Britain persevered in counterinsurgency efforts because (1) British 
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officials always felt that the long-ruling Al Bu Said dynasty could establish a legitimate 
pro-British government and thus British leaders never felt they had lost the peace, (2) 
British leaders knew that PFLOAG was a Communist entity hostile to the West, and (3) 
should Oman fall into unfriendly hands, not only would Oman‘s oilfields be lost to the 
West, but all of the Gulf‘s oil would be threatened by Communist control over the Straits 
of Hormuz. 
 
The Aden Emergency 
 Aden‘s strategic location at the southwest tip of the Arabian Peninsula made it a 
convenient way station and staging ground for deployments throughout the Middle East, 
East Africa, South Asia, and the Far East.  By the early 1960s, Britain desired to end its 
old protectorate treaty relationships with the tribal leaders of the Aden protectorates and 
merge their territories with the Aden colony, creating the Federation of South Arabia.
126
  
Beginning at the end of 1963, two independence groups began a violent struggle against 
Britain and the nascent South Arabian Federation government.  These groups were the 
Egyptian-backed Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY) and the National 
Liberation Front (NLF), backed by China and the Soviet Union.  In 1966, Britain decided 
it would no longer maintain its military commitments in the Far East and that it would be 
cheaper to guarantee British oil supplies by expanding existing bases in the Persian 
Gulf.
127
  Yet even after the decision to close Aden base, it was assumed that Britain 
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would succeed in establishing a stable, pro-British government, subsidized by Britain, 
and inclusive of Britain‘s old tribal allies.128   
 In the spring of 1964, British forces were struggling to suppress a tribal-
nationalist revolt in the Aden Protectorates that was backed by the Egypt and Yemen 
Arab Republic, a Nasserite state on Aden‘s northern border (it was later known as North 
Yemen after Aden became South Yemen following the British withdrawal).  Despite the 
challenges, Conservative Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home believed ―we must be 
resolute in maintaining our position in southern Arabia‖ and the Cabinet agreed to 
militarily crush the rebels, even though the campaign was likely to be a protracted one 
requiring reinforcements from Britain.
129
  By the end of May, British forces seemed to be 
successful in suppressing the insurrection.  The rebels were being beaten back from all 
but the most reclusive mountain areas and military officials were confident punitive air 
strikes would deter further rebellion.  The High Commissioner in Aden was hopeful 
about reaching a constitutional compromise with the various faction leaders in Aden and 
the Protectorates.
130
  It was even felt that Aden would be a future base of nuclear 
weapons.
131
   
In October the Labour Party took power and Harold Wilson became Prime 
Minister.  In December, new Colonial Secretary Anthony Greenwood visited Aden to 
work on the difficult task of establishing a permanent government of the tribal sheikhs, 
through whom Britain had long administered the hinterland, and the local members of 
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Britain‘s administrative council in the city of Aden.  The sheikhs jealously guarded their 
internal power while Aden‘s cosmopolitan elite did not want to be subsumed into what 
they feared would be a backward and feudal British puppet state.  Though Britain had 
combined the tribal and Adeni leaders into the Federation of South Arabia, all parties 
could not agree on a constitutional framework for a post-independence government.
132
  
However, the visit filled Greenwood with optimism and he reported to the Cabinet that he 
hoped to establish a friendly and democratic government that would fully respect human 
rights.
133
  In 1965, Aden‘s troubles largely stayed off the radar of the Cabinet, despite a 
steady increase in British casualties.
134
  British efforts continued to no avail to establish a 
constitutional accord on Aden‘s future.  Still, the Cabinet was in no hurry; Greenwood 
lamented the ―unfortunate‖ delays but cautioned against any ―early initiative‖ on 
Britain‘s part.135  Nasser‘s Egypt was Britain‘s main concern in the Middle East and 
British officials believed Egypt would continue to use its military presence in Yemen to 
support the rebels in Aden.  Despite this provocation by Egypt, the Foreign Secretary 
reported that Nasser‘s regime was ―increasingly precarious‖136 and in a weak position 
vis-à-vis Britain and other regional powers, which would enable Britain to outlast Egypt 
in the struggle for Aden‘s future.137 
 The biggest development regarding Aden‘s future in 1965 was the growing idea 
that a permanent military base in Aden was no longer necessary.
138
  Wilson‘s 
government, driven in part by a desire to increase domestic social welfare spending, felt it 
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had to curtail its military commitments in Asia, ―East of Suez.‖  In the beginning of 1966, 
the government decided Britain should no longer maintain its military commitments in 
the Far East and that it would be cheaper to guarantee British oil supplies by closing 
Aden and expanding existing bases at Sharjah and Bahrain in the Persian Gulf.
139
  Even 
after the decision to close the Aden base, the goals of Britain‘s military campaign to quell 
Adeni unrest remained unchanged.  Wilson, along with the Secretaries of State for 
Foreign Affairs and Defence, still wanted to establish a stable, pro-British government, 
subsidized by Britain, and inclusive of Britain‘s old tribal allies.140 The main difference 
was that this government would not host a permanent British military base.   
In May of 1966, concerns arose about the viability of Britain‘s vision for Aden.  
Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart and Defence Secretary Denis Healey argued for 
staying the course in Aden.  Stewart argued Britain was ―under an obligation to assist the 
Federal Government in building up local forces so that they could take over the defence 
of the country when we left. This was agreed.‖  Failure to do so ―would gravely damage 
United Kingdom interests‖ as ―the humiliation of a disorderly withdrawal would weaken 
confidence in us in the Persian Gulf: and our failure to bring South Arabia to 
independence in an orderly manner would damage our prestige throughout the world.‖141    
Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan was a sharp critic of the Foreign and 
Colonial Office‘s plans for a protracted campaign in Aden.  While the Defence and 
Foreign Ministers spoke of building of local forces, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
pointed out that with the UK supplying three-quarters of the Adeni budget, an 
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independent Aden would not be solvent by the 1970s.  He suggested only a small 
increase in funding be given ―in order to secure our own withdrawal.‖  In the end, Wilson 
came down on the side of Stewart and Healey, though the records show ―there was 
however a difference of view in Cabinet and some members felt that it should be possible 
to meet our minimum requirements [a safe withdrawal of British troops and equipment] 
at a lower level of expenditure.‖142   
Despite the grumblings, most of the Cabinet still felt it essential that the British 
drawdown be done orderly and that local troops be readied to handle internal security 
themselves and external security with limited British assistance.  Cabinet members 
accepted the Foreign Office view that South Arabia must not fall to pro-Egyptian forces 
and that Britain‘s failure to leave behind a friendly regime would undermine its position 
in the Gulf, perhaps fatally.
143
  Even as a severe budget crunch was forcing a reevaluation 
of Britain‘s global position, the Cabinet approved additional aid for Aden.144  The forces 
in Aden were spared any of the Defense spending cuts for the general Middle East.
145
  
Early in 1967 George Brown, Stewart‘s replacement as Foreign Secretary, told the newly 
appointed High Commissioner to Aden, Sir Richard Turnbull, there would be no 
Palestine-like ―scuttle‖ from Aden.146   
Yet in 1967, a scuttle began to appear like the only way out.  Hopes that Britain 
could win the peace by shoring up the South Arabian Federal government vanished, 
leading to Britain‘s decision to abandon the country at the end of the year.  Despite the 
assurances given to Turnbull, the continued failure to reach a political settlement and 
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dissensions amongst the Arab troops convinced British leaders that continued military 
efforts were futile.  Efforts to reach out to elements of FLOSY ended in failure.
147
  In a 
Cabinet meeting on Aden on March 16, Brown announced that the situation in Aden was 
―bad and deteriorating.‖148  Not only were the guerrillas fighting British forces, but also 
each other, making it near impossible to reach an agreement with them.
149
  Brown 
proposed that every effort be made to reach out to dissident groups, ―to broaden the basis 
of the Federal Government.‖  Brown was far less concerned than his predecessor, 
Stewart, with the ramifications of failure in South Arabia.  His main concern was 
withdrawing British troops by the end of the year ―with the least risk either of extending 
the period during which we maintained forces in South Arabia or of becoming involved 
with Federal forces in dealing with internal security‖ after South Arabian independence, 
which he wanted set at November 1, 1967.  Brown suggested the Royal Navy ―station a 
strike carrier and a commando carrier (with an embarked commando [Marines]) in the 
area,‖ for ―it was not thought likely that Egyptian forces from the Yemen would attempt 
to invade South Arabia, at least as long as it was supported against external aggression.‖  
The rest of the Cabinet agreed to his proposals.
150
   
In the spring and summer of 1967, Cabinet members and British officials felt 
rather powerless in the Middle East.  In April the Cabinet debated dumping the Aden 
problem on the UN and having them figure out a solution; the Ministers doubted Britain‘s 
ability to find one.
151
  In May a Foreign Office memorandum discussing a possible 
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British confrontation with Nasser noted, ―the days are past where we could take effective 
action on our own.‖152  Though hopes were meager, the Cabinet decided that to continue 
Brown‘s plan to aid to the Federal government and its forces, hoping both would increase 




These hopes were dashed as the insurgents demonstrated their control over the 
population.  In a memorandum to the Cabinet Brown noted that ―the terrorist 
organisations demonstrated their ability to dictate a complete strike.‖ The British feeling 
of helplessness deepened with the mutiny of the Arab troops and police in June.
154
  
Defence Secretary Healey noted back in May 1966 that Britain was ―dependent… on the 
Federal Regular Army‖ in its efforts to secure a stable, pro-British regime in Aden.155  
Now even the troops recruited and paid by Britain could not be counted on.  Even though 
British forces were able to retake the Crater area of downtown Aden, intelligence 
predicted future mutinies were likely.
156
  By the fall, the British-backed Federal 
government had collapsed.
157
  The government they had hoped to shore up disintegrated 
in the face of insurgent violence and the army that was supposed to prop up the new 
regime was mutinous and rife with tribal and ideological divides.  Though British arms 
could establish a degree of order as demonstrated by the Battle of the Crater,
158
 they 
could not achieve the Cabinet‘s long term political goal:  military withdrawal coupled 
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with the establishment of a stable and friendly successor government.  The situation was 
not unlike that in Ireland in late 1920 and 1921:  the successes of British arms against the 
insurgents did not endear the population to a pro-British political order, which was 
underscored by the inability to maintain loyal local security forces.  Britain had lost the 
peace. 
New intelligence analysis and Egypt‘s retrenchment after losing the Six Day War 
in June cemented the Cabinet‘s decision to abandon Aden at the end of 1967.  After the 
Six Day War, a weakened and chastened Egypt withdrew from Yemen and reached out to 
Britain.  Given his humiliating defeat by Israel, Nasser felt he could no longer afford 
British enmity as well.  In November, the same month the last British forces left Aden, 
Egypt and Britain reestablished diplomatic relations and Egypt communicated its 
intention to begin refining oil at Aden‘s refinery, allow British passage through Egyptian 
airspace, and promised to try to bring Aden‘s warring guerrilla armies to an agreement.159  
Thus even if Britain left chaos in its wake in Aden, hostile Egyptian forces would not 
overrun the country.  During the summer and fall, the Cabinet received reports stating the 
National Liberation Front, which was emerging as the strongest guerrilla faction, was an 
indigenous movement drawing inspiration from the Ba‘athist parties of the Levant and 
would not jump into Nasser‘s camp.  The Foreign Office suggested that the NLF and 
Britain had a common aim in reducing Egyptian influence in Aden.
160
  It was in fact to 
the NLF that Britain handed sovereignty to at the end of the year.  The NLF‘s future 
alignment with the Soviet Union and China was not foreseen by the Cabinet or the 
Foreign Office. 
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Why did Britain Quit? 
The same three factors that prompted Britain to abandon Ireland—the failure to 
―win the peace,‖ the notion that an insurgent-run state would not be hostile, and the 
realization there was nothing in the territory Britain needed—led Britain to abandon 
Aden.  As the war progressed, British leaders felt increasingly less able to shape South 
Arabia‘s political future by military means.  The optimism of the early military victories 
in 1964 gave way to the despair and helplessness of 1967.  As the tribal leaders, FLOSY, 
and NLF failed to come to accord despite repeated attempts at mediation, British officials 
were losing faith that they could engineer any sort of solution legitimate in the eyes of 
Adenis.  The mutinies of the local security forces were a stark indicator that Britain had 
―lost the peace‖ in Aden.   
The Anglo-Egyptian détente of late 1967 and flawed analysis of the NLF made 
withdrawal even more acceptable to the Cabinet.  Despite the fact that the NLF desired to 
establish a state called ―The People‘s Democratic Republic of Yemen‖, Foreign Office 
analysts felt the group was a nationalist one influenced by Levantine Arab nationalism.  It 
was assumed that the NLF had a common interest with Britain in containing Egyptian 
influence in Arabia.  The Cabinet did not realize that an East Bloc client state would 
emerge after British withdrawal. 
With the decision to close the base in Aden, there was nothing else in Aden that 
Britain needed.  Defense officials felt that air power in Oman, additional battalions in the 
Gulf, and an offshore flotilla could contain Egypt much more cheaply and mitigate a lost 
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ground presence in Aden.
161
  Aden‘s value was as an anchor of Britain‘s Arabian littoral 
defenses, not as a major source of petroleum.  This meant that Aden could be abandoned 
without fear of losing access to Middle East oil. 
 
Other Factors Examined 
One explanation long given for Britain‘s withdrawal from Aden and the Persian 
Gulf is that the Labour government abandoned British commitments in Asia to increase 
domestic spending social welfare spending.
162
  In fact, Wilson‘s government sheltered 
Aden‘s war budget from the overall defense cuts and offered additional financial aid and 
weapons to Adeni factions as late as the summer of 1967 in hopes of attaining a better 
political outcome.
163
  While finances did lead to Britain‘s reevaluation of its role East of 
Suez and the decision to curtail that role, it is not true that the conflict in Aden simply 
became too expensive.  While spending cuts were being made in 1966 and 1967, funding 
for the war in Aden and other aid to South Arabia was not touched.
164
  Wilson‘s 
government was willing to fund the involvement in Aden even though it meant greater 
cuts in military spending in the Far East and Persian Gulf.  And in the short run, costs 
were fixed because of the time it would take withdraw men and material, many of which 
were engaged in combat.
165
 
Concern over public opinion was also not a leading cause of withdrawal.  
Throughout the conflict, Cabinet members voiced concern over how the British public 
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perceived the War, but this was not decisive in the decision to withdraw.  Public opinion 
was seen as a public relations issue to be dealt.  When the first British reinforcements 
were dispatched in 1964, the government wanted to carefully explain the issue to friendly 
reporters as part of its public relations strategy and also chastised colonial and military 
officials for not being careful enough in dealing with the press.
166
   Incidents such as the 
mutilation of British casualties and the revelation harsh interrogation and detention 
measures were seen as storms to be weathered.   Healey suggested that in order to not 
―prejudice our prospect of successfully disengaging ourselves from South Arabia and of 
leaving behind an organised State‖ the government not ban harsh detention practices.167  
Regarding the decision to withdraw, Brown said, ―there would be criticism in some 
quarters in this country when our plans were announced. Our policies were, however, 
likely to command general agreement in Parliament and in the country and could easily 
be defended.‖  Thus, when public opinion was discussed in relation to withdrawal, it was 
that public opinion would be supportive of withdrawal, not that it was forcing it.
168
   
The same can be said of international opinion.  Foreign Secretaries often noted 
that the situation in Aden, along with that of Rhodesia and other lingering imperial 
commitments, caused much international criticism of Britain, especially in the UN.  
While the Cabinet often lamented this, they did not view Third World complaints as 
reason to alter policy.  The typical response was that of November 24, 1966, when the 
Cabinet noted ―with approval, the tribute paid by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 
to the United Kingdom Representative at the United Nations and that of the staff of the 
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United Kingdom Delegation‖ for hanging tough during a blistering few days of anti-
British harangues.
169
   
 
The Dhofar War 
 Throughout the nineteenth century British influence in Oman had increased to the 
point that by the early twentieth century the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman was a de 
facto British protectorate, treated functionally the same way as its other Persian Gulf 
protectorates, such as Bahrain, Qatar, and Trucial Oman (the modern day United Arab 
Emirates).
170
  By the mid-twentieth century, Britain ran Oman‘s foreign affairs, 
controlled its government, and ran the Omani military, which was commanded by British 
officers.  Mail service was even provided by the Royal Mail.
171
  British troops were also 
stationed at the RAF bases at Salalah and Masirah Island.  The de jure ruler was Sultan 
Said bin Timur who lived in isolation from his country in a remote palace surrounded by 
his British officials and African slaves.  He banned virtually all modern technology, 
forbade Omanis from working abroad, and allowed no advanced schools to be 
established, fearing these would breed Marxists and Arab nationalists.  Many British 
officials concurred and did little to discourage the Sultan‘s anti-modernization stance. 
Some Omanis, especially those from the Western Dhofar province, felt 
differently.  The Dhofaris are a non-Arab minority, culturally and geographically distinct 
from the rest of Oman.  They resented the Sultan‘s rule and many went abroad, especially 
to the Persian Gulf, to work.  The War in Oman‘s Dhofar province began about a year 
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after violence began in Aden, when a guerrilla group formed by former expatriate 
workers attacked an oil exploration vehicle in December 1964.  British-led Omani forces, 
most of them ethnic Baluchis from Pakistan, mounted an ineffectual campaign over the 
next few years against the rebels, but the highest levels of British government were 
unconcerned.  The Cabinet started taking much greater interest in Oman in 1967, when 
Omani oil production began.
172
  It was also in the mid-1960s that the situation in Dhofar 
worsened as the Dhofari nationalist Dhofar Liberation Front was renamed the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) and took a decidedly 
Communist tone.  PFLOAG began receiving substantial financial and material support 
from China and the Soviet Bloc.
173
  Anglo-Omani military efforts were failing to contain 
the revolt, and British officials began to blame the Sultan‘s inflexibility for the inability 
to defeat the guerrillas.
174
  With the British withdrawal from Aden at the end of 1967, the 
guerrillas achieved a safe haven from which to conduct operations and ship in weapons.  
By 1969, much of the Dhofar province was effectively in rebel hands, and the additional 
British troops were sent to RAF Salalah to keep it open and prevent the base from being 
overrun.
175
  The rebel successes began to attract the attention of British policy-makers.  In 
the summer of 1970, PFLOAG attacked oil facilities far from Dhofar in central Oman.  
This further alarmed British officials and led the British managers of Petroleum 
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Development (Oman) Ltd (a British-run subsidiary of Shell with a concession for oil 
production in Oman) to urge action by the British government.
176
   
Fortunately for Britain, a perfect candidate for Sultan Said‘s successor existed:  
his son, Qaboos bin Said.  Qaboos had been educated at the British military academy at 
Sandhurst, served in the British army in Germany, and was now kept under house arrest 
in Oman by his father, who viewed him as too Western and untrustworthy.  Qaboos had 
no Omani friends and little contact with Omanis, but was allowed contact with British 
officers and officials in Oman.  Britain could easily depose Said, given their control of 
the Omani military.  Qaboos would be dependent on Britain, even more so than his 
father, given his isolation from and ignorance of the Omani political scene.  Edward 
Heath‘s newly elected Conservative government approved the coup plan which was 
orchestrated by the Foreign Office and British intelligence, and carried out by seconded 
British officers and possibly British special forces on July 23, 1970.
177
 
The plan succeeded marvelously.  Said was deposed without bloodshed and 
bundled off to exile in London.  Qaboos invited Britain to send substantially more troops 
to Oman, implement political and governance reforms devised by British officials and 
consultants, allowed MI6 to establish a new intelligence service run entirely by British 
military and intelligence officers, and spent much of his oil wealth on British weapons 
systems.
178
  Over the next five years, British and Omani forces then gradually secured 
key areas of Dhofar and beat back PFLOAG in a campaign military scholars consider a 
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  By 1975 PFLOAG had ceased to exist.  The 
Anglophile Sultan remains in power and maintains close relations with Britain to this 
day.  The Omani military and intelligence services were British run well into the 1980s.  





Why Did Britain Stay? 
The question becomes why, with the British decision to abandon Aden in 1967 
and close all bases and withdraw all troops from the Persian Gulf by 1971, did Britain 
continue fighting an East of Suez war well into the 1970s?  The answer is that Britain felt 
it could win the peace, saw PFLOAG victory as irreconcilable to British national 
security, and had to keep Omani oil fields and the vital Musandam Peninsula in friendly 
hands to access Persian Gulf oil.   
Unlike Aden, where British leaders despaired of finding a suitable political 
outcome, they always felt they could ―win the peace‖ in Oman.  Often during the war, the 
military situation in Dhofar seemed dire, but it was never felt that the efforts of British 
arms were futile.  Key to this optimism was Qaboos bin Said.  As Foreign Secretary (and 
former Prime Minister) Alec Douglas-Home told the Cabinet, Qaboos ―was likely to 
adopt more enlightened policies than his father; and the change would be welcomed‖ in 
Oman.
181
  Said had named Qaboos his heir and Qaboos would have legitimacy as a 
member of the long-ruling Al Bu Said dynasty.  The coup was welcomed in Oman and 
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there was no reason to assume Qaboos‘ rule would not be accepted as legitimate by 
Omanis.  His time in Britain and the British army had left a deep Anglophilic streak in 
the young prince and his isolation from Omanis meant he would be pliant to the desires 
of his British officials and ―advisors.‖ With Qaboos on the throne, British officers could 
implement the military, political, and economic reforms they felt necessary to defeat 
PFLOAG.  Once the rebels had been beaten, Oman could easily transition into a modern, 
informal relationship with Britain in which Britain would withdraw its troops and bases 




Unlike Sinn Fein in Ireland and the National Liberation Front in Aden, PFLOAG 
was seen as being hostile to Britain‘s interests should they take power in Oman.  
PFLOAG were strident Communists, with commissars and Chinese advisors.
183
  In the 
words of a senior British general in Oman, PFLOAG ―offered management of the country 
under close Russian control.‖184  There would be no acknowledged connection to Britain 
(as in Ireland) or perception of common interests (as was thought the case in Aden).  
Instead, a country in the Western camp would have shifted to the Communist one. 
Finally, a friendly Oman was crucial to Britain‘s oil supply.  By late 1967, Omani 
oil production satisfied ten percent of British oil needs.  Given that Britain effectively 
controlled Oman, British leaders could count on Oman to continue supplying oil to 
Britain in the event of a general Arab oil embargo, like that which occurred during the 
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1967 Six Day War.
185
  More importantly, Oman‘s ruler controlled the Musandam 
Peninsula, which juts out from Arabia towards Iran to form the Strait of Hormuz, the 
narrow chokepoint all oil tankers leaving the Persian Gulf must pass through.  The power 
that controlled Musandam had the power to disrupt the entire world‘s oil supply.  This 
was a key concern for Britain, which was dependent on Persian Gulf oil.
186
 The Foreign 
Office felt that ―the contribution which our forces make directly or indirectly to physical 
security along the southern shore of the Gulf (Trucial Oman Scouts and help to the Sultan 
of Muscat‘s Armed Forces), is of particular importance in the new oil-fields which are 
now, or will shortly be, coming into production.‖187  The senior British officers directing 
the war were well aware that the reason for British involvement in Oman was ―Britain‘s 
own national interest in maintaining both stability in the Gulf and the free flow of oil.‖188  
Unlike Aden, where the loss of territory to anti-British groups could be contained by 
offshore forces and nearby airpower, the Omani oilfields and Musandam Peninsula 
needed to be in pro-British hands to guarantee Britain‘s oil supply. 
 
Other Factors Examined 
 Britain‘s ruling party changed hands twice during the course of the Dhofar War, 
but this appears to have little impact on the course of British policy in Oman.  The War 
began during Harold Wilson‘s first Labour government, continued through Edward 
Heath‘s Conservative government and then ended during Wilson‘s second term as Prime 
Minister.  In January 1968, shortly after the withdrawal from Aden, Wilson announced 
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Britain would withdraw from the Gulf by 1971.   Even after the withdrawal date was 
announced, Wilson‘s government reinforced British troops in Oman189 and the plotting of 
the Omani coup was conducted during the final days of the Wilson government.
190
   
 While Tory opposition leader Edward Heath was highly critical of the 
government‘s decision to withdraw from the Gulf, a 1969 visit to the region convinced 
him the genie could not be put back in the bottle and he implemented the Labour 
withdrawal timetable after becoming Prime Minister in 1970.
191
  He soon ordered the 
Omani coup
192
 and further escalated the Dhofar War.  After Wilson returned to power in 
1974, his government again sought to find savings by cutting overseas military 
commitments.  After initially proposing to cut the UK involvement in Oman, the Cabinet 
decided to maintain the operation.
193
   
 All in all, the impact of party and ideology on decision-making seems small.  
Both Wilson and Heath seemed reluctant to abandon policies put in place by their 
predecessors.  As Wilson‘s 1968 announcement on Gulf withdrawal and internal debates 
in 1974 show, he and the Labour Party were more willing to consider abandoning foreign 
military commitments in favor of domestic spending, as his ideology would suggest.  But 
the British departure from the Arabian littoral was part of the long post-war transition 
from formal physical control of distant lands to informal relationships with local rulers.  
Wilson did not envision a complete abandonment of the Gulf—British officers would 
continue to be seconded to local forces and commercial ties were expected to continue.  
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Both Wilson and Heath understood the importance of keeping the Straits of Hormuz in 
friendly hands and tended to follow the long-term policies set by their predecessors. 
As in Aden, Ireland, and Mesopotamia, finances caused a reexamination of the 
war, but ultimately the factors I have indentified and not cost drove the decision to 
remain in Oman.  By the early 1970s Britain faced an expensive counterinsurgency in 
Northern Ireland and Wilson‘s government sought to cut other parts of the defense 
budget, especially the few lingering East of Suez commitments.  In October 1974, Wilson 
endorsed a plan to end British involvement in Oman, as well as to reduce Hong Kong‘s 
garrison and pull all troops out of Brunei.
194
  But with progress on the ground continuing, 
Wilson and the Cabinet decided that November to keep British involvement going and 
made cuts elsewhere in the defense budget.  As Defence Secretary Roy Mason noted, ―in 
present circumstances‖—Anglo-Omani military successes—it would be a shame to 
abandon the war.
195
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The four cases discussed above suggest that a strong power quits a fight against a 
weak enemy when (1) it feels that its military force can no longer contribute to a desired 
political outcome, (2) that the political order post-military withdrawal will not threaten it, 
and (3) the territory being fought over does not provide access to a resource the strong 
power needs.   
In Aden and Ireland, the insurgency‘s demonstrated control over the population, 
the collapse of support for pro-British local institutions and the resignation (in Ireland) or 
mutiny (in Aden) of native security forces convinced the Cabinet that they had ―lost the 
peace‖ even if British military forces were making gains against insurgents.  In 
Mesopotamia and Dhofar, British leaders always felt that their military actions were 
leading towards a desirable political outcome.  Prevailing over the insurgents would pave 
the way for the establishment of locally-run governments friendly to Britain who would 
handle most of their own internal security.  In the persons of Feisal in Iraq and Qaboos in 
Oman, Britain found rulers they could control while building an effective and locally 
legitimate administration around.  In both countries, Britain was either recruiting or felt 
they could recruit local security forces.  In neither conflict was Britain always winning 
the war, but it never seemed on the verge of ―losing the peace‖ should they prevail 
militarily.  This is in sharp contrast to Ireland, where IRA leader Michael Collins was the 
most influential local leader and the Irish police were resigning in large numbers, and 
Aden where Britain‘s chosen tribal sheikhs saw their authority vanish even in their own 
regions as local police mutinied and fought with the rebels against the British army. 
 Doyle 55 
 
The realization that British-backed rule had lost local legitimacy coincided with 
the assumption that rule by Britain‘s foes—Sinn Fein in Ireland and the National 
Liberation Front in Aden—would not produce states hostile to Britain.  This was 
indicated by Sinn Fein‘s willingness to accept Dominion status, as opposed to a republic, 
and (ultimately false) intelligence analysis of the NLF‘s intentions.  In Mesopotamia and 
Oman, British leaders always assumed a political order dominated by their foes would be 
an unacceptable risk to national security.  Abandonment of Mesopotamia would have left 
the center of the Middle East open to Soviet Bolshevik and Turkish nationalist forces.  
Cabinet members, based on assessments from soldiers and administrators in 
Mesopotamia, felt that Turkey, the Soviet Union, or France would have seized the rich oil 
fields of Mosul and could have threatened the oil fields in Basra and Persia if Britain 
abandoned northern and central Mesopotamia.  In Oman, the British leaders had no doubt 
that PFLOAG was a Soviet client and their victory meant a Communist state that could 
halt the flow of oil to Western Europe.  A chaotic Mesopotamia vulnerable to foreign 
invasion and a Communist-run Oman were simply irreconcilable with British security 
interests. 
Withdrawing from either Mesopotamia or Oman would have jeopardized British 
access to the oil reserves in those countries.  When a strong power seeks political control, 
even partial control, (in all four cases Britain envisioned it would exercise incomplete 
political control over the disputed territory in the future) for the access to something in 
the territory, quitting the fight probably means losing that access.  The main value of 
Ireland and Aden to Britain was for military defensive purposes:  Ireland secured 
Britain‘s western maritime approaches while Aden was the western flank of Britain‘s 
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Arabian littoral.  When a strong power seeks control over a distant territory because it is a 
useful defensive buffer, then other steps can be taken to mitigate the loss of the territory.  
The fight does not take the same all-or-nothing aspect and the strong will be willing to 
negotiate withdrawal with its weaker foe.  The defensive concerns associated with the 
loss of Ireland and Aden were mitigated by retaining naval bases in Ireland and beefing 
up British forces in the Persian Gulf and off Aden‘s coast. 
This analysis does not deal with the ―battlefield‖ explanations that many studies 
of insurgency focus on.
196
  Because irregular conflicts in which a much weaker 
combatant fights a much stronger one seldom are resolved by a Clausewitzian 
―disarming‖ of the strong‘s forces, these battle field interactions are of greatest 
importance in how they affect the strong‘s policymakers‘ perception of the conflict.  
Ultimately, the weak can only be victorious if they convince the strong to quit and go 
home.  The degree of mechanization, the level of interaction with the local population, 
and the interaction of the military strategies all do shape events on the ground, which in 
turn shape policymakers‘ analysis and actions.  This paper links the battlefield 
interactions studied by Arreguin-Toft, Lyall and Wilson, Record, and others to the 
decision-making that occurs at senior levels of government in the strong power. 
My thesis most directly contradicts Gil Merom‘s findings which posit that 
democracies abandon counterinsurgencies when a significant portion of the liberal and 
educated class grows fed up with the war and especially the brutal coercive measures 
needed to defeat irregular fighters, thus forcing the government to abandon the 
conflict.
197
  British outrage at reprisals in Ireland and negative publicity of harsh 
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interrogation and detention measures in Aden did not quickly lead to withdrawal.  
Punitive actions in Mesopotamia and media accusations of atrocities in Oman also did 
not cause those campaigns to fail.
198
  In fact, Colonel ―Mad Mitch‖ Campbell‘s brutal 
victory in the ―Battle of the Crater‖ at the end of the Aden War was welcomed in Britain 
and made him a household name.  He later used his fame to get elected to Parliament.
199
  
The records of Cabinet deliberations instead show that while ministers were aware and at 
times concerned with public disapproval of the war, they were willing to weather 
criticisms to pursue British objectives by force.  The key point of Merom‘s argument is 
that ―modern democracies lose protracted small wars because in situations of deep 
instrumental dependence, the politically most relevant citizens create a normative 
difference of insurmountable proportions‖ (italics in original).200  Perhaps Merom‘s cases, 
which were all fought with conscript militaries—and thus involved more directly a much 
greater portion of society and a greater ―instrumental dependence‖—have a different 
dynamic than my four British cases, all of which were fought by professional soldiers.  
Merom even argues at the end of his book that America and France‘s transitions to 
volunteer militaries has made it easier for the presidents of the two countries to intervene 
in small wars abroad.
201
  Yet this does not square with his assertion that democracies lose 
small wars ―because they find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and 
brutality to that which can secure victory.‖202  Why would the ―politically most relevant 
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citizens‖ accept brutality committed by professional soldiers but rail against brutality 
committed by conscripts? 
What seems more likely is that unless there is ―deep instrumental dependence,‖ 
politicians can afford to ignore public criticism of distant counterinsurgencies.  By 
employing a volunteer army and making heavy use of local or other forces (such as the 
paramilitary Royal Irish Constabulary, the Indian Army in Mesopotamia, the Federal 
South Arabian Army and Police, and the Sultan of Oman‘s Armed Forces), it seems that 
the British government was able to avoid a ―deep instrumental dependence‖ on British 
society in waging these wars.  However, as Aden and Ireland demonstrate, this lack of 
instrumental dependence does not mean a strong power will not withdraw.  Britain was 
also able to prevail over insurgents in Malaysia and Kenya with conscripts in the 1950s, 
showing that conscription need not doom a counter-insurgency campaign. 
Dominic Tierney‘s concept of a ―quagmire mentality‖ developing in the public 
mind
203
 is also misplaced, at least in regard to Britain.  Strong power withdrawal results 
from the formation of a quagmire mentality not in the public‘s mind, but in the minds of 
key decision-makers.  When the Cabinet members believed Britain was embroiled in a 
military quagmire—that British military efforts were not contributing to a desired 
political outcome—it decided on military withdrawal.  If this was not the case, the 
politicians were willing to ride out public criticism.   
The cases also do not support the contention by Robert Taber
204
 and Joseph 
Kraemer
205
 that distant counterinsurgencies are simply abandoned because they get too 
expensive.  As the War Office told the Cabinet, war in Ireland cost only a tenth as much 
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as war in Mesopotamia.  In the last months before withdrawal in Aden, Britain was 
willing to spend additional sums if it felt a better outcome could be got.  While it seems 
that difficulties in paying the economic and military costs of fighting rebellions overseas 
generally led to a reevaluation of and then retreat from empire after the Second World 
War, neither Ireland nor Aden was abandoned simply because it alone was too expensive.  
For a strong power, even one as diminished as Britain was in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
ability of distant guerrillas to raise economic and military costs were more than matched 
by Britain‘s ability to shift and reallocate resources.  Calm regions such as India and 
Persia could be weakened to bolster a restive Mesopotamia.  Necessary defense cuts 
could be made in Hong Kong to keep the Dhofar campaign going.  Skeptical 
Parliamentarians could be won over by arguing that costs were temporary and leading to 
a result in the national interest.  The Cabinet noted that it would be necessary to show 
Parliament that the expensive troop presence in Mesopotamia was not open ended and 
would soon be reduced.
206
  Similarly, the Cabinet prevented cuts to the Dhofar war by 
arguing ―in present circumstances‖—Anglo-Omani military successes—it was best to 
keep funding the war.
207
   
 
Avenues for Further Research 
 There are numerous avenues to further research on the outcomes of such 
asymmetric conflicts.  A first would be to look at non-British cases.  It could be that the 
nature of British society or government makes certain aspects of its policymaking process 
unique.  Britain‘s Cabinet system means consensus among leaders of the party is required 
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for major decisions, while the concentration of power in a single chief executive in the 
United States and French may give American and French presidents more leeway to chart 
their own policies.  Britain‘s long imperial history may have conditioned British leaders 
and society to the idea of frequent wars abroad, lessening the nature and level of public 
opposition distant counterinsurgency campaigns generate. 
Another area of research would be the impact of conscript versus professional 
troops is.  It makes sense that it would be politically easier for leaders to continue wars in 
which professional troops, rather than conscripts were used.  But Britain both won 
(Malay and Kenya) and lost (Cyprus) colonial insurgencies in the 1950s when it had a 
conscript army.   
It may be especially illuminating, if it becomes possible, to examine the archives 
of autocratic powers that faced irregular wars in foreign lands, such as Egypt in North 
Yemen or Portugal in its African colonies, to see if their leaders‘ deliberations differ 
dramatically from those in democracies.  There is no reason that the factors I have 
identified would not apply in autocracies as well as democracies, so research confirming 
that would buttress my argument. 
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